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Entrepreneurship, Windfall Gains and Financial Constraints: Evidence
from Germany
Abstract
We investigate the link between the propensity to become an entrepreneur and
exogenous release from financial constraints in Germany. This is defined in terms
of the movement from employment to self employment on receipt of a financial
windfall. A theoretical framework developing Evans and Jovanovic (1989) is set
up and tested with panel data from German households. The results show that
financial constraints do exist given that individuals are more likely to start a
personal business after receiving a windfall gain. The value of windfall gains has
a significant but non linear effect on the decision to become self employed. The
data reveal that differences in ability and income affect the change in employment
status. We also report that there is no evidence that becoming self employed
involves the anticipation of windfall gains.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, windfall gains, financial constraints.
JEL: G20, M13.
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1 Introduction
The question of whether funding gaps inhibit entrepreneurship has generated intense
debate within both economic theory and public policy for more than two decades. In
their seminal article, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that information asymmetry leads to
inefficient credit rationing. In contrast, de Meza and Webb (1987) argue that information
asymmetry results in overfinancing for entrepreneurs. An empirical evaluation of these
conflicting views is now even more important given that governments have identified
entrepreneurship as an important source of employment and growth (Audretsch, 1995).1
There is a considerable amount of research on the effect of financial constraints on en-
trepreneurship in the US and the UK using household panel data. However, comparable
analyses of European countries such as Germany are still scarce. This paper investi-
gates the extent to which, in Germany, the likelihood of starting a business is affected
by financial constraints. Following the approach employed in previous US studies (e.g.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998)) we use household survey data to obtain self employ-
ment information. Our data come from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
Germany has experienced a steady decline in the number of start-ups in recent years. In
total, around 800 000 new firms were set up in 2008 which was roughly one half of the
total number of the record year 2001.2 The number of full-time start-ups fell from nearly
670,000 in 2003 to about 330,000 in 2008. In 2001, part-time entrepreneurs started over
900,000 new businesses but in 2008 it was less than 470,000. Around two thirds of all
start-ups use own funds with only one third of coming from external sources. The over-
whelming importance of own funds suggests that entrepreneurs face potential financial
constraints, Thus, exogenous positive shocks to personal wealth may be an important
driver for start-up activity in Germany.
The German government has introduced a number of polices designed to ease fi-
nancial constraints and encourage business start-ups. At both federal and state levels
1The European Commission considers entrepreneurship as a crucial element for achieving its political,
social and economic objectives, see http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/entrepreneurship/.
2Citation: http://www.kfw.de/DE Home/Research/Steckbriefe.jsp.
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the government has launched a large number of equity and debt programs aimed at
arresting this decline. The programs include guarantees, interest rate subsidies and di-
rect investment by state-owned financial institutions. The state-owned German Bank
for Reconstruction (KfW) launches, on a regular basis, programs that promote the fi-
nancing of start-ups. For example, small start-ups can benefit from a program called
Start-up Money. The program started in 1998 and offers loans of up to 50,000 Euros.
Larger and more capital-intensive start-ups can apply for subordinated loans from the
start-up fund of the European Recovery Program or from KfW loan program for en-
trepreneurs. In 2004 the German government created the “ERP-EIF Dachfonds”3, a
pool of funds that provides e 500 million specifically for equity-investments in high-tech
start-ups. It is planned to double the value of this fund in the near future. The German
government has also established a credit mediator who negotiates with banks on behalf
of the entrepreneur. Start-ups from universities or research institutions are eligible to be
supported through scholarships under the EXIST program and founders of particularly
technically challenging start-up projects can receive grants.4
These numerous attempts by the German administration to make entrepreuneurs
access to external finance more easy raises the question of how severe liquidity constraints
are in Germany. We study this question by evaluating the impact of windfall gains on
the probability of moving from employment to self employment.
Measuring the release from financial constraints is not straightforward, because of the
two-way links between access to external financing and personal wealth. To overcome
this difficulty, we hypothesize that an exogenous increase in wealth has the effect of
increasing the probability of entering entrepreneurship given that financial constraints
exist. A positive relationship between the propensity to enter entrepreneurship and the
proxy for the exogenous wealth increase therefore suggests that financial constraints
limit entrepreneurship. This hypothesis is tested by employing windfall gains as a proxy
for an exogenous increase in wealth.
3ERP and EIF are the abbreviations for European Recovery Program and European Investment
Fund respectively.
4See http://www.existenzgruender.de/englisch/self employment/launch/support programmes/index.php
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The paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, to the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyse the impact of financial constraints
and their effect on the movement from employment to self employment in Germany.
Second, we consider categories of individuals that exhibit similar characteristics in terms
of income and ability. Third, if individuals anticipate a windfall gain, the gain will not
be exogenous. We therefore evaluate the exogeneity of the windfall gain by analyzing
the effects of different lags and leads of windfall gains on the self employment decision.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We find that windfall gains signifi-
cantly increase the probability of becoming self-employed. The data reveal considerable
variation in the effect of windfall gains across the income and ability subsamples. High
income groups are more likely to become self-employed. In addition, high-ability groups
are more likely to set up their own businesses after receiving a windfall. Finally, the
results suggest that windfall gains are not anticipated and can therefore be considered
as an exogenous shock to personal wealth.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the literature on finan-
cial constraints. In Section 3 we develop the theoretical model and set out the econo-
metric methodology; Section 4 gives a description of the data and reports the results;
and finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions and proposes areas of further research.
2 Literature on testing financial constraints
Empirical research into the financial constraints faced by entrepreneurs has to address
two major challenges. The first is that financial constraints cannot be measured directly.5
It is therefore necessary to use a proxy measure and an increase in net worth provides
a means of testing the presence of liquidity constraints, Evans and Jovanovic (1989)
and Taylor (2001). The liquidity constraint hypothesis argues that a lack of capital, or
collateral, will prevent new business start-ups.
5Some studies (e.g. van Praag, de Wit and Bosma (2005)) use direct reports from entrepreneurs
about the financial constraints they encountered. However, reported constraints are also an imperfect
measure of frictions in the financing markets because they do not reveal whether the rejection is the
result of ability estimations by the bank or to asymmetric information.
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The second challenge is that wealth, as the most commonly used proxy for the release
from financial constraints, may be endogenously determined.6 Xu (1998) shows that
individuals considering potential self-employment accumulate personal wealth prior to
their decision to switch into self employment. This would mean that the reported rela-
tionship between wealth and self employment is endogenously, rather than exogenously,
determined.
The endogeneity issue has been addressed in a number of papers, for example, Blanch-
flower and Oswald (1998), Taylor (2001) and Disney and Gathergood (2009). These pa-
pers use an exogenous increase in wealth as a proxy for the easing of financial constraints
in relation to the self-employment decision. A number of different measures of wealth
increase have been used including unanticipated windfall gains (Taylor, 2001); inheri-
tance (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Hurst
and Lusardi, 2004)) and increased housing wealth (Disney and Gathergood, 2009). All
report a significant relationship between the release from liquidity constraints and the
entry into self-employment.
In addition, there is evidence from Sweden, Lindh and Ohlsson (1996), that lottery
winnings increase the probability of becoming self-employed. More generally, Johansson
(2000) uses an income measure of wealth and finds that liquidity constraints are present
in Finland. Paulson and Townsend (2004) also find evidence that financial constraints
affect entrepreneurial activity in Thailand.
An alternative form of exogenous wealth increase relates to housing assets. Black,
de Meza and Jeffreys (1996) for the UK, and Hurst and Lusardi (2004) for the US find
evidence of a positive relationship between increases in housing wealth and business start-
ups. However, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) show that the relationship becomes insignificant
when a fifth-order polynomial is specified and that only for the top 5% of the wealthiest
people did the increase in financial resources via housing market gains have a significant
impact on entrepreneurship.
6The banking literature suggests that personal wealth is the most natural candidate for capturing
the relaxation of financial constraints given that it can serve either as equity or as collateral (Bester,
1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987).
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In contrast to UK and US housing markets, the peculiarities of the German housing
market mean that the impact of housing wealth on the decision to become self employed
is likely to be minimal. Owner occupation is still relatively rare. In addition, house prices
in Germany have fallen since the mid 1990s. Therefore this form of easing of financial
constraints is unlikely to have had a significant impact as an exogenous increase in
wealth. We therefore analyse the impact of a broader definition of windfall gain on the
decision to move from employment to self employment.
Additionally, we assess the impact of the exogenous windfall on groups of individuals
sharing the same, or similar, characteristics. Such groupings would act as a proxy for
individuals whose a priori propensity to enter entrepreneurship is likely to be similar
and therefore variations in the entry decision will only be caused by different financial
constraints. Finally, windfall gains such as bequests may be anticipated, something
which questions their exogeneity as an easing of financial constraints. This proposition
is analysed by the testing of lead and lag windfall gains on the decision to become self
employed.
3 Theoretical background and empirical implemen-
tation
3.1 Model setup
The analytical framework used to identify the basic drivers of the occupational choice
develops Evans and Jovanovic (1989). Consider the representative agent who decides at
the start of the period between her own business activity or working for someone else.
At the end of the period the individual gets profit from self-employment activity equal to
pi or wage W . We denote the self-employment decision of employed individuals at time
t as Switchit. Labour is considered as non-divisible, so that the individual can either
work as an entrepreneur or as an employee. Non-divisibility makes W the opportunity
cost of entrepreneurship and implies
Switchit =
{
1 ; pi −W ≥ 0
0 ; pi −W < 0.
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Self-employment generates gross returns of
y = θIγξ (1)
where θ is a measure of “ability”, I is the amount of business investment, γ < 1 reflects
the productivity of the investment, and ξ is a log-normal disturbance whose logarithm
has variance σ2ξ and E(ξ) = 1. We assume decreasing marginal returns of investment.
Individuals are considered as risk-neutral. At the time the investment decision is made,
the realization of ξ is unknown, and potential entrepreneurs decide based on expected
values. The individual owns equity E¯ to start her business but needs additional funds
L from financial institutions. One unit of borrowing costs the gross interest rate R.
The opportunity cost per unit of equity is r. In the absence of financial frictions the
individual would invest
I∗ = L∗ + E¯ (2)
where L∗ is such that the marginal return of investment equals the gross interest rate R.
For simplicity we assume that r = R. The borrowing capacity is modeled by Lˆ(θ). We
assume that financial institutions rate individuals by collecting information about their
personal entrepreneurial abilities. This rating implies an increased borrowing capacity
if the (observable) personal abilities go up and vice versa. The individual is financially
constrained if Lˆ(θ) ≤ L∗, that is, the optimal amount of borrowing exceeds borrowing
capacity.
The phenomenon of borrowing capacity falling behind the desired borrowing level is
a result of asymmetric information. If lenders lack private information on their clients’
ability to repay, they may limit their downside risk by binding the amount of credit on
the would-be entrepreneur’s publicly observable individual characteristics. We derive
the following expected net profit from starting an own business given that financial
constraints exist
pin = θ
[
Iˆ(θ)
]γ −R(Lˆ(θ) + E¯)−W (θ) (3)
We assume W (θ = 0) = w¯ > 0 and W ′(θ) > 0. Ability θ also affects the success in
employed work. This assumption implies that wage and ability are positively correlated.
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Derivation of net profits with respect to a marginal increase in personal wealth E¯ yields
δpin
δE¯
= θγ
[
Iˆ(θ)
]γ−1 −R > 0. (4)
The marginal return from an additional unit of equity exceeds the costs if the individual
is financially constrained. Thus, more equity and the subsequent increased level of
investment results in higher profits. In cases with an increase high enough to make gross
profits exceeding the threshold W , individuals switch into self-employment. Thus our
model predicts for all individuals sufficiently close to the marginal individual
∂Switchit
∂E¯
> 0.
Accordingly, the exogenous wealth increase is our main variable of concern in the em-
pirical framework.
Derivation with respect to entrepreneurial abilities gives
δpin
δθ
=
[
Iˆ(θ)
]γ
+
(
θγ
[
Iˆ(θ)
]γ−1 −R)δLˆ
δθ
− δW
δθ
. (5)
Note that the expression in brackets in (5) is positive as long as the entrepreneur is
financially constrained, that is, Iˆ < I∗. However, the sign of the derivative depends on
the magnitude of the impact of ability on W . With a positive (negative) sign of (5)
high-ability individuals are “nearer” to the switching level, and are expected to have
a higher (lower) chance of switching than low-ability types if their equity E increases
exogenously. Empirically, we use sub-samples of distinct ability and income groups to
test how the impact of the exogenous wealth increase on self-employment is affected by
entrepreneurial ability and income from employment.
3.2 Econometric specifications
As Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), we proxy the exoge-
nous wealth increase by windfall gains. However, our measure is broader and includes
not only inheritance, but also additional extraordinary payments, such as bequests and
lottery wins as defined in the GSOEP. On the basis of our theoretical predictions, we
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estimate the following specification of the reduced form of the transition from full time
employment to self-employment selection equation
Switchit = Λ(δ windfallsit−1 + νZit +Xt + εit) (6)
where i represents individuals, t is time, Switchit is a dummy variable equal to one if the
person decides to be self-employed in the next period and zero otherwise, windfallsit−1
is a dummy variable equal to one if the person received windfall gains in the previous
period and zero otherwise, Zit is a vector of the person-specific variables, Xt is a set of
time dummies, and Λ is the cumulative density function of the logistic distribution.
The vector Zit includes factors that reflect ability and several other characteristics of
the individual which we use as controls.7 The dummy variable gender is equal to one,
if the person is female and zero otherwise. The individual’s education is represented by
education and is measured by the number of years in education. The variable married
provides information about the marital status, it is equal to one if the individual is
married and lives together with the partner, and it is zero otherwise. This variable
proxies a typical family background. The variable hhsize measures the number of persons
living in the particular household. Finally we employ four dummy variables which reflect
the person’s age: 20-30, 31-40, 41-50, and 50+.
Given that the model is testing the impact of windfall gains on the change from
employment to self-employment, we include a measure of income opportunity cost. We
therefore estimate the following regression for employed individuals only
Incomeit = α0 + α1educit + α2experit + α3marriedit + α4genderit (7)
+AGEitΓ + ui + εit
where Incomeit is individual income or labour earnings, Ageit is the set of age dummy
variables, experit is the length of time with a particular firm in years, while marriedit,
7These controls are similar to those included by others in the literature (see, e.g. Evans and Jo-
vanovic (1989), Evans and Leighton (1989)). We experimented with other controls, including education
dummies, country of origin, employment of parents. None of the additional controls affected our main
results.
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genderit, educationit is defined as before. Finally ui is the individual specific term. We
interpret this term as an individual’s ability. The predicted values from this regression
are rescaled to construct the foregone wages measure, wageit.
8
3.3 Subsamples
The empirical literature investigating the degrees of financial constraints faced by en-
trepreneurs has identified that individual-specific characteristics play an important role
(e.g. Paulson and Townsend (2004)). Given the predictions of our theoretical model, we
hypothesise that individuals that belong to different income and ability groups will have
different likelihoods of becoming entrepreneurs. Consequently, we split the sample into
subsamples based on personal income, as estimated in (7), and on ability. The latter is
proxied by the individual specific term ui from the same equation.
9 The splits are based
on individuals’ average values of the characteristics lying in the first or fourth quartiles
of the sample. For instance, a person with average labour earnings above the 75%th
percentile of the distribution will be classed as high income, while a person with average
labour earnings below the 25%th percentile will be classed as low income. The same
process applies to ability.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Data
To investigate the effects of windfall gains on the likelihood of starting a business, we
use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). It is a wide-ranging representative
longitudinal study of private households. It provides information on all household mem-
bers and consists of Germans living in the Old and the New German States, foreigners,
and recent immigrantsin to Germany. The Panel started in 1984. On average there are
about 47,000 personal characterics per year. Incomplete answers and sample screening
8For rescaling we employ monotonic transformation, wageit = log( ̂Incomeit). This rescaling is
needed to avoid negative expected values of predicted income.
9See Griliches (1977) for more details on measuring abilities.
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produce a sample of 61,380 individual characteristics for the years 2000-2006. We apply
a number of selection criteria to the data. First, given that we are investigating the
movement from employment to self employment, we drop all unemployed people from
our analysis. Second, to eliminate individuals that are still in school or are close to
retirement, individuals older than 65 and younger than 20 were also excluded.
As Taylor (2001), we use data collected annually concerning labour market activity
in the periods between interviews. An individual is defined as self-employed if the person
answers the question ”What is your current occupational status?” with ”Self-employed”
in the current period, but responded with other answers indicating employment in the
previous period. Windfall gains are defined in the GSOEP as inheritance, donations,
lottery winnings and payments due to assets such as life insurance.
Insert Table 1
Descriptive statistics for the annual means of all variables employed in the analysis
are described in Table 1. We see that about one percent of German individuals started
their own businesses, and six percent of individuals received windfall gains.
4.2 Econometric Results
In this section we present our estimation results on the link between the likelihood of
being self-employed and windfall gains. Table 2 presents results from regressions of
the self-employment dummy variable on windfall gains and our control variables for
gender, household size, age dummies, marriage and education. We report marginal
effects, estimated around mean points.10 Column 1 shows the results for the windfall
dummy. Column 2 reports the result for the value of windfall gains. Column 3 includes a
squared term for the windfall value and tests the hypothesis that above a certain value,
the windfall is so large that there is no need to continue working. Column 4 shows
the results when we exclude all individuals whose parents are self employed. This is
done because it is possible that business owners are more likely to leave a bequest, in
10Estimations of marginal effects around median points suggest similar results.
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the form of an existing business, than are non-business owners. The inheritance may
therefore not result in the movement from employment to self employment and to the
creation of a new business. The receipt of an inheritance could therefore be a proxy
for the fact that the individual simply had a parent that was a business owner (Scha¨fer
and Talavera, 2009).11 As a result, a finding that inheritance is an important influence
on the decision to start a business could be interpreted as suggesting that being the
offspring of an entrepreneur increases the probability of starting a business.
Insert table 2
Column 1 indicates that the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur increases when a
person receives a windfall gain. The coefficient on windfall is positive and statistically
significant at 1%. In Germany, receipt of a windfall gain increases the probability of
starting an own business by 0.50%. The result supports the hypothesis that additional
wealth matters when moving from employment to self employment and therefore suggests
binding financial constraints.
The coefficient of the expected wage variable is insignificant. This finding suggests
that the opportunity cost effect of earnings from regular employment is not important
in Germany. Unlike Lindh and Ohlsson (1996), we find no evidence that women are less
likely to become self-employed than men when receiving a windfall gain. Age decreases
the likelihood of becoming self employed in Germany with the strongest results being
found in the over 50 age group. The number of years in education is positive and highly
significant as is household size. Marital status does not affect the probability of becoming
self employed.
Column 2 shows that the value of windfalls is an important influence on the decision
to enter self employment with higher valued windfalls more likely to lead to a movement
into self employment. The column 3 result shows that, as hypothesised, the relationship
is non-linear with higher value windfalls making it less likely for the recipient to move
from employment to self employment. Column 4 shows that, for Germany, the proba-
11See also Panunzi, Ellul and Pagano (2009).
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bility of starting a business is positively related to windfall gains for those that are not
related to business owners.
Insert Table 3
Table 3 reports the results for ability quartiles with column 1 showing the lowest
ability and column 4 capturing the highest ability quartiles. We find that windfall gains
do not affect the probability of becoming self employed in the lowest ability group.
However, as hypothesised, the coefficient is significant and positive in the highest ability
quartile. The marginal effect on becoming self employed given a windfall gain is 0.60% for
the highest ability group. The significant result for the second ability quartile suggests
a non linear relationship.
Insert Table 4
Table 4 shows the effect of income on the self employment decision with column 1
reporting the results for the lowest income quartile and column 4 the highest income
quartile.. The results are significant and positive for the top two income quartiles only.
The highest marginal effect occurs in the highest quartile, 0.80%. Thus, within the
low income groups, the potential benefits are insufficient to make this group move to
self-employment after receiving a windfall gain. In contrast, despite the higher oppor-
tunity cost, the high income groups are capable of achieving even higher incomes from
self-employment and therefore the exogenous increase in wealth moves them over the
threshold. These findings are consistent with results obtained by Hurst and Lusardi
(2004) who report that the probability of becoming a business owner in the United
States is a non-linear function of wealth and that only at the top of the wealth distribu-
tion is there a positive and significant relationship between an exogenous wealth increase
and entrepreneurship.
The analysis is further developed by looking at the interaction of ability and income.
We find that high income and high ability individuals are more likely to move into self
employment on receipt of a windfall gain. The interactive term results in a marginal
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effect of 1.2%, higher than for the sample as a whole. The interactive term for low
income and ability groups is insignificant, suggesting a non linear relationship.12
The preceding analysis is based on the underlying assumption that windfalls occur
randomly and that individuals do not predict the receipt of particularly inheritances.
However, if individuals did predict the receipt of a windfall gain, the assumption that
windfalls occur randomly would not hold. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) find that both past
and future inheritances predict current business entry. This suggests that inheritances
capture more than simple liquidity.
Insert Table 5
Table 5 provides an additional attempt at discriminating between the results pro-
posed here and those of Hurst and Lusardi (2004). Instead of instrumenting personal
wealth by inheritance, we employ lag and lead windfall dummy variables. Columns 1
and 2 report different lag periods, t-1 and t-2, and columns 3 and 4 different lead periods,
t+1 and t+2. The significance of the windfall variable changes depending on whether it
is a lag or a lead. The results for lags are significant and positive whereas those for leads
are insignificant. The results therefore suggest that those moving from employment to
self employment do not anticipate windfall gains.
5 Conclusions
This paper has analysed the impact of a windfall gain on the probability of moving from
employment to self employment in Germany. It therefore assesses the importance of
the financial constraints faced by would-be entrepreneurs. We find that windfall gains
have a positive impact on the decision to move from employment to self employment.
However, the results differ between different income and ability sub-samples. The anal-
ysis shows that the income matters for the top two income quartile groups and for the
top ability quartile. The income results therefore suggest that financial constraints are
present for high income groups but not for low income groups. Thus the opportunity
12The estimation results are available upon request.
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cost at low incomes is not binding whereas for high income groups the additional antici-
pated returns are sufficient to move into self employment when financial constraints are
eased. We also find a non linear relationship between ability and the movement from
employment to self employment after the easing of financial constraints. We find no
evidence that those moving into self employment anticipate receiving a windfall gain in
the short run. Overall, the results suggest that there are binding financial constraints
to entrepreneurship in Germany.
The results have important implications for policy in Germany. Faced with decreases
in the number of new business start-ups, the German government has introduced a
number of financial programmes designed to encourage the move into self employment.
However, it may be that the types of businesses being supported, and the types of
financial help being offered, have to be reassessed. In addition, the limitations placed
on the assistance may also have to be re-evaluated.
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Data Appendix
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
The GSOEP - windfall gains are derived from positive answers to the following questions:
• Did you or another member of the household receive a large sum of money or other
forms of wealth (car, house, etc.) as inheritance, gift, or lottery winnings last year?
We refer to money or other forms of wealth worth more than 2,500 EURO.
• Did you receive any sort of compensation or severance package from the company?
• Did you or another member of the household own any of the following savings or
investment securities?
– Savings account;
– Savings contract for building a home;
– Life insurance;
– Fixed interest securities;
– Other securities;
– Company assets.
How high was the income received from interest, dividends and profits from these
savings and securities in the last calendar year?
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable µ Median σ N observations
New Self-employed 0.01 0.00 0.09 61,380
Windfall dummy 0.06 0.00 0.25 61,092
Windfall, 100K EUR 0.02 0.00 0.30 61,000
Female 0.52 1.00 0.50 61,380
Education 12.36 11.50 2.69 61,380
Married 0.72 1.00 0.45 61,380
Age 30+ 0.30 0.00 0.46 61,380
Age 40+ 0.34 0.00 0.47 61,380
Age 50+ 0.26 0.00 0.44 61,380
Household Size 3.02 3.00 1.23 61,380
Log(Imputed Wage) 9.97 10.23 1.00 61,380
Note: N is sample size, while σ and µ represent standard deviation and mean respectively.
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Table 2: Logit Estimates of Individual Self–Employment Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Windfall 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
Windfall value 0.001* 0.002**
(0.000) (0.001)
Windfall value2 -0.000**
(0.000)
Wage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 30 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 40 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 50 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household Size 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N. observations 61,380 61,271 61,271 60,526
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Chi2 119.125 106.052 109.623 115.443
d.f. 9 9 10 9
Note: The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation of the transition into self–employment.
Regressions include constant and time dummy variables. Huber–White standard errors are reported in
the brackets. Marginal effects are estimated around mean points. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Logit Estimates of Individual Self–Employment Decision by ability quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Windfall 0.002 0.010** -0.000 0.006**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Wage 0.027*** 0.008** 0.001 -0.001**
(0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Married -0.005* -0.003 -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Female 0.022** 0.007* -0.002 -0.008***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Age 30 -0.008*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 40 -0.011*** -0.001 -0.003* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Age 50 -0.008*** -0.003* -0.003** -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Household Size 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education -0.002 -0.001 0.001** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
N. observations 14,414 14,372 15,654 16,930
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05
Chi2 56.500 31.255 25.146 82.294
d.f. 14 14 14 14
Note: The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation of the transition into self–employment.
Regressions include constant, and time dummy variables. Huber–White standard errors are reported
in the brackets. Marginal effects are estimated around mean points. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Logit Estimates of Individual Self–Employment Decision by income quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Windfall 0.002 -0.000 0.006* 0.008**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Wage -0.000 0.008** -0.000 0.009
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008)
Married -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.002 0.006* -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Age 30 -0.004*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Age 40 -0.003*** -0.003* 0.000 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Age 50 -0.002** -0.002 -0.002 -0.005
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Household Size 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.002**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education 0.001*** -0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
N. observations 12,263 15,835 16,414 15,423
R2 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02
χ2 74.873 31.752 22.697 40.821
d.f. 14 14 14 14
Note: The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation of the transition into self–employment.
Regressions include constant, and time dummy variables. Huber–White standard errors are reported
in the brackets. Marginal effects are estimated around mean points. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Logit Estimates of Individual Self–Employment Decision, Different windfall
lags
windfalli,t−2 windfalli,t−1 windfalli,t windfalli,t+1
Windfall 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Wage 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married -0.002 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 30 -0.002* -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 40 -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 50 -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household Size 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
χ2 126.293 164.947 96.582 83.057
d.f. 14 15 14 13
Note: The table reports marginal effects after logit estimation of the transition into self–employment.
Sample size is 61,380 observations. Regressions include constant, and time dummy variables. Huber–
White standard errors are reported in the brackets. Marginal effects are estimated around mean points.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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